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This essay considers the potential for utilizing web games for research and teaching. It discusses a specific 
gaming facility that has been constructed and utilized. The gaming facility can be made available for use 
for those interested in utilizing it for teaching and/or research purposes. The goal is to have this facility be 
of use for both single play and repeated matrix games. Much of the discussion here is aimed at single play 
games as a desirable benchmark preliminary to the study of repeated games. Properties of the one stage 
games are discussed and instructions for the use of the system are supplied. Extensions to multistage games 
and incomplete information are noted. 
 
JEL Classification: C7, C9, D03 
 
Key words: matrix games, experimental, teaching and computerized games, 
 
 
1. On Matrix Games 
It is difficult for an undergraduate in any of the social sciences to obtain his or her BA without at some 
point having been subjected to the paradox and the wonders of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. This simple 
2 2  matrix game has been the subject of many thousands of essays and experiments and poses a deep 
problem in economics, social-psychology and psychology concerning individual competition and 
cooperation. 
 Two immediate features that make the 2 2  game attractive are that binary choice plays a central 
role in the study of individual behavior and two person interactions are central to socio-psychological 
analysis. 
 Matrix games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PD) have been used both for one-shot 
experiments and to study repeated play. There are various theories as to what one should do in both 
instances In the approaches as to how the games are played and how they should be played there has 
been, to some extent, a dichotomy between normative and behavioral theorizing. In much of pure game 
theory the solution concepts suggested can be interpreted as normative: The rational individual should 
play such and such. A behavioral approach is concerned with how individuals play. Furthermore the 
behavioral assumptions made by the game theorists by no means fully represent the views of the social-
psychologists or the psychologists. 
 A debate goes on as to whether the Nash noncooperative equilibrium (or some of its many variants) is to 
be considered as a normative or behavioral solution. It is a thesis of this essay that a way to consider the 
links between the two approaches is via experimental gaming. 
 There is little question that the analysis of the playing of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game poses several 
deep and difficult problems but even if one restricts oneself to only 2 2  games with strictly different 
entries (no ties) with payoffs 1, 2, 3, and 4, there are, even at that level of simplicity 4! 4! 576   
different games that can be constructed.
2
 They merit concern along with the PD. Taking into account that 
changing the rows and columns of any one of these games leaves the games strategically unchanged to a 
game theorist (but not necessarily to a social psychologist)  who can argue that there are really only 144 
different games. A psychologist could say that games with rows and/or columns permuted look different 
to the players and one could make a case for experimenting to see if a different behavior is manifested 
with a change in row or column representation. 
 Undoubtedly one of the main topics in game theory, and in different ways in psychology and social-
                                                          
2
 The game with entries 1,2,3,4 seems to be extremely special, but it serves as a jumping off point for considering 
games where each agent selects numbers within the interval [0,1] which enables on to consider finite games with 
entries of any size. 
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psychology is how people learn (and teach) when playing in repeated games. There is a considerable 
literature involving individuals such as Selten, Aumann, Kreps, Fudenberg, Samuelson, Mailath, and 
many others considering items such as reputation, threats and signaling in multistage games. The concern 
is also with lack or presence of common knowledge and initial and future information conditions. 
 These concerns with dynamics are undoubtedly of import, and there is a need for massive 
experimentation with dynamics. Nevertheless it is worth asking if there is anything left to learn about the 
simple one-shot play of the 2 2  matrix game where the cues are primarily structural rather than 
behavioral. The belief expressed here is that there are still some items worth considering and they can 
serve as useful benchmarks prior to our natural concern with repeated plays. Furthermore by building this 
apparatus first designed to experiment with the one shot games one can easily extended it to serve as a 
platform that can be enlarged for repeated play in some situations as is noted below. 
 
2. On the Classification of the Structure of 2 x 2 Games 
 
This essay deals primarily with the gaming system constructed and how to use it. A companion essay 
[Shubik 2012] discusses the question of what constitutes a solution to a game; but included here are some 
insights into the structure of matrix games and brief comments on two solution concepts; the 
noncooperative equilibrium and the cooperative game. 
Over the course of the last forty years there have been several approaches to classifying 2 2  matrix 
games. A natural question to ask prior to discussing these attempts is why should one study the 2 2  
matrix games in the first place? 
An appropriate philosophical view of matrix games is that if one is going to start simple maybe one 
should first address the 0 0  and then the 1 1  matrix games. I leave the 0 0  game to the more 
philosophically inclined and observe that there are some problems with the contextual interpretation of 
the 1 1  game. With a choice set for each player of one strategy, there is no choice. As anyone who has 
utilized experimental gaming knows, even with the stark abstract representation an implicit contextual 
assumption has been made that there is a history such that either the players do not have the choice not to 
play, or that they have implicitly consented to play. Lest I be accused of nit picking I leave further 
interpretations of the 1 1  to the reader. The suggestion here is that the 2 2  game is inordinately suited 
to experimentation. An important property of the 2 2  is that it is the smallest intrinsically symmetric 
strategic structure where each player has an explicit real choice. However if ties are feasible we must take 
into account pathologies such as games with constant payoffs regardless of choice (suppose all ija a ; 
all ijb a ). 
 1 2 
1 11 11,a b  12 12,a b  
2 21 21,a b  22 11,a b  
Table1 
 
Why not experiment with 3 3  or bigger games? Much of the answer lies in the psychology, the 
mathematics and the modeling. In the seminal article “The Magic Number 7 2 ,” George Miller [Miller 
1956] suggested around 5 9  separate items are about as large a number as can be absorbed by an 
individual’s short term span of attention. The eight payoff numbers of the 2 2  fall into this span, but the 
eighteen numbers associated with the 3 3  do not. For any matrix 3 3  or larger some extra structure 
must be imposed on the entries in the rows and columns if they are meant to represent any structure 
encountered in the investigation of society. For example, we have approximated a Cournot duopoly 
economic model with continuous payoffs by a matrix with a matrix grid up to may be 20 20  or 30 30  
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(Shubik and Siegel, [1963]). In experimental games with a matrix larger than an 2 2  it is usually 
desirable to provide a context and to impose some structure on the jumble of numbers in the matrix. Even 
with the 2 2  game there is a tendency to hang special names on some of the structures such as the 
Prisoner's Dilemma, The Stag Hunt, The Battle of the Sexes, although there is little evidence that 
individuals who do not know the name of the structures are able to associate the names and the structures 
[Powers and Shubik, 1982?]. 
Rapoport, Guyer and Gordon published a pioneering work [RGG 1976] on the 2 2  games that 
contained many experiments and used the classification of all strongly ordinal 2 2  matrix games 
suggested by Rapoport and Guyer [RG 1966]. Given the date of the work it was a tour de force to have 
not only experimented with 78 one shot games (see Appendix 1), but also reported on both cardinal and 
ordinal variations as well as considering repeated games. Since then other classifying schemes such as 
that of Peter Borm [1987] in which fifteen classes of games have been suggested. 
The number 78 noted above was arrived at by reducing the complete class of the 576 2 2  matrix 
games observing that there are 66 games each with 8 representations obtained from interchanging rows, 
columns and the roles of the two players and there are 12 games that because of the symmetric roles of 
the players have only 4 representations; giving a total of 66 8 12 4 576     games. Recently Robinson 
and Goforth [RG 2005] presented a topological classification of all of the 576 games and argued that one 
should consider that from the view point of game theoretic analysis one should consider the full set of 144 
games obtained by just considering the row and column transpositions as this set is symmetric from the 
viewpoint of the players. 
Baranyi, Lee and Shubik [1982] studied the structure of the payoff sets of the complete set of the 576 
2 2  matrix games and showed that the payoff structures can be represented by 24 payoff sets (see 
Appendix 2). They did not indicate any behavioral structure in their representations. The work by 
Robinson and Goforth did, as is noted below. 
A natural question to ask of the 2 2  matrix games is what does the structure look like when there 
are ties Kilgore and Frazer [1988] considered the possibility of ties. We have observed that the set of all 
games without ties is 4! 4!  , but with ties one has 
424 65,536  possibilities. Kilgore and Frazer were 
able to show that, using the classification Rapoport, et al. [1966] of one could reduce the 65,536 to 726, 
but this number of games is already not within easy range of experimentation. The difference between the 
games with and without ties can be viewed as considering selecting the payoffs from a set of numbers 
with replacement and without replacement. 
In their classification and display of 2 2  games Robinson and Goforth utilized a display that 
enables the strategic structure and optimum response to be shown easily on the same graph. An example 





The vertex in the lower left has coordinates (1,1) and the four cells are represented by the points 
(3,3), (4,1), (1,4), and (2,2). The solid lines link the strategic choices for the Row Player and the dashed 
lines for the column player. The arrows indicate an optimal response; thus this representation skillfully 
mixes considerations of strategy and behavior sketched on the payoff structure (which is given by the 
convex hull of the four points). 
Robinson and Goforth [2005], like Rapoport et al., try to find a natural taxonomy for all the games. 
They propose a periodic table analogy based on topological considerations, where they discuss and 
develop the concept of structural closeness of any two games They extend their work by taking into 
account ties [Robinson, Goforth and Cargill, 2007]. however they were not able to extend fully this 
method of classification. It is somewhat difficult to envision a topological approach offering a serviceable 
taxonomy for matrix games with more than two strategies each and more than two players. 
In my view it is highly desirable to investigate and experiment with games with weak orderings 
because they can be used to reflect lack of fineness of perception. Many decision problems involve 
individuals with different perceptions and expertise, where in several payoff entries A cannot distinguish 
the payoffs yet B, may be able to distinguish between them. 
Unfortunately the number of cases encountered in attempts to classify the 2 2  games with ties is so 
large as to make it difficult to use the whole class for experimental games in the way that is feasible for 
the set of games with strictly ordinal payoffs. As soon as one goes to the 3 3  matrix the number of 
strategically different matrices is 9! 9!/3! 3!   or approximately 3.658 billion. It is fairly evident that 
from the viewpoint of experimental gaming one needs to specify some extra structure or set of structures 
to be considered. All possible worlds will not do; although one still may wish to contemplate what 
structure gives interesting 3 x 3 experiments.  Baranyi, Lee and Shubik  [1992] carried out some estimates 
of the limiting properties for the shape of the payoff set, the Pareto set and the individually rational set of 
outcomes for an arbitrarily large matrix games with more than two players and more than two strategies; 
but there is still considerable work to be done considering different forms of aggregation as the number of 
6 
 
players and/or strategies become large. The imposition of some forms of aggregation and communication 
and encounter structure is called for when considering games larger than the 2 2 . 
In conforming to the idea of keeping an approach as simple as possible in the experimental apparatus 
discussed here I suggest that it is useful to consider a cardinal classification scheme where we consider 
the payoffs to be measurable and comparable, hence the operator addition may be regarded as 
meaningful. If we regard the ordinal entries 1, 2, 3, 4, as cardinal and comparable then we can add the 
payoffs in each cell and observe that the is a natural categorization of all of the games into four categories 
where the jointly maximal payoff adds to 8, 7, 6, or 5. We note immediately that all games that have a cell 
with sum 8 are all games of coordination and have that cell as not merely a joint maximum, but also as a 
noncooperative equilibrium point. All games with the maximum sum of 5 are constant sum games, or 










The mixed motive games have a maximum of 6 or 7. A further classification of these games requires 
a variety of extra conditions such as symmetry, strategy domination, existence of a pure strategy 
equilibrium point, uniqueness and individual rationality. 
If players are offered a money payoff for the sum of the score from playing a set of the games each is 
motivated to maximize the expected score in each game. 
 
3. A Web approach to Experimental Gaming and Teaching Games 
 
In the late 1950s, Merrill Flood and I discussed the potential value of utilizing the gambling information 
generated in Las Vegas to provide mass crude statistics on gambling with individuals using their own 
time and money. After several failures to obtain the appropriate connections to realize such a scheme we 
abandoned the idea. We nevertheless felt and I still believe, especially given the vast improvements in 
computer and communication technology, that the social sciences could benefit from the gathering of 
mass game playing statistics. Life is lived for the most pert in more or less noisy environments. The hope 
is that large samples, even if gathered with less control than one might have in the laboratory will provide 
insights into game playing behavior such that they can serve to connect various theories of behavior in 
these structures with some evidence of play. 
In some of the taxonomies for the one shot games use is made of optimal response considerations. 
On a little reflection an optimal response requires that the individuals be given information of a previous 
position in the outcome of the game against which an agent can respond. In essence by requiring that an 
initial condition be specified one has embedded the single shot game into an ongoing socio-psychological 
process, far richer than that called for by the single shot-in-the-dark play noted here below. When initial 
conditions are specified that include history the solution set is enlarged. 
 
3.1. An Apparatus for Teaching and Research 
 
The view of a web gaming facility suggested here is evolutionary. Start small and then build out. Concern 
oneself with one relatively simple experimental goal and one teaching goal. get the system set up to 
perform these modest tasks, Debug the system with one or two operational runs accepting as a given the 
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overwhelming odds that in the first few runs something will be forgotten or something will go wrong; but 
as the system functions purposefully the errors will be corrected and the omissions discovered. 
An example of a somewhat different website, but built in the same spirit is that of Ariel Rubinstein 
(http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/). 
In the early days of operations research, gaming and simulation, especially in the construction of 
simulation languages there was an enthusiasm for the construction of grand purpose simulators. An 
example of such a simulator was provided by Jay Forrester in his development of Systems Dynamics that 
was meant to be destined to be able to solve all feedback system economic problems and influenced the 
thinking of the Club of Rome. Unfortunately as is now well recognized by economists studying 
evolutionary game theory or incomplete contracts, ecological systems have the nasty habit of depending 
on unaccounted for dynamics and unintended consequences from actions that should have caused no 
problems. 
In spite of the considerable flourishing of experimental gaming in economics as evinced by the work 
of Siegal, Smith, Plott, Roth, Guth, Holt, Sunder, Fehr, Rubinstein, Schotter, Huber and many others there 
has been little work to try to mass produce data from the web. 
The approach adopted here is that in a way similar to how individuals can play backgammon or 
chess on the web, one should be able to construct an apparatus to gather large sample size experimental 
data from web games where interest in the games and small monetary prizes help to motivate the players. 
I conjecture that the use of the games as part of a teaching program in game theory, economics or social 
psychology can produce considerable experimental data of use from large numbers of students motivated 
by the classes and possibly a small monetary prize. 
Ideally I believe that we should be considering developing a set of standardized experiments that 
could be analyzed more or less automatically. In some sense they would be an analogue of a Tibetan 
prayer wheel that produces its prayers without human intervention. This collection can be made without 
the use of a formal laboratory and nevertheless conforming to privacy conditions of the players. In 
essence this already happens in the gathering of traffic statistics. 
Furthermore although at this time there are many legal, technical and societal problems involved it 
appears to be feasible to design a set of experimental games where a not for profit experimental 
establishment could charge players an admission fee to play in an appropriately designed and 
parameterized non-constant sum game using say 97–98% of the money for prizes and cover experimental 
costs with the remaining 2–3%. This would have the extra benefit that the players have some of their own 
money at stake and experimental costs could be highly reduced or covered. There is no attempt to do this 
here, but it is noted as a relatively natural step in the future. 
 
 
3.2. The Specific Apparatus for Teaching and Research 
The approach adopted here was to design an easy to use game structure on the Web that could first be 
employed to construct two games to test the play of the complete set of all strategically different 2 2  
(cardinalized strictly ordinal) games by visitors to a dedicated website (http://www.museumofmoney.org)  
These visitors could be from the general public, students in a class or professionals such as attendees at a 
conference on game theory or social psychology. 
It is aimed also for use in the classroom motivated by a class exercise and/or by a small monetary 
prize. I believe that the latter should be pedagogically preferred. Reasonably simple games in the 
classroom appear to be effective teaching devices and can yield useful data to students and teachers 
Shubik [1978] 
 
3.3. The apparatus and the Program for One-shot Games Research 
 
The first goal has been to set up conditions to experiment with one-shot play of all 144 strategically 
different 2 2  matrix games. In Appendix 2 we give a listing of all 144 games. The matrices are 
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presented in string form, the first two numbers are the contents of the upper left entry; the next two upper 
right; the next two lower left and the final two lower right. Robinson and Goforth provide a handy set of 
all of the optimal response diagrams classified into four sets. We utilize other representations as we 
comment on both ordinal and cardinal constructions. In Appendix 1 some of the results of the plays of 
the Rapoport et al., 78 games are shown. Underneath each pair of numbers in the payoff matrices appears 
the percentage of the player pairs making this selection; thus for example, Game 3 is The Stag Hunt and 
62% chose the Pareto optimal noncooperative equilibrium, while 4% chose the risk dominant 
noncooperative equilibrium. Other results concerning this run are discussed in a companion paper. Here 
the major purpose in displaying the output is to show that one obtains considerable experimental 
information directly from the display. To the right and below each matrix appears the information on the 
number of Row and Column players who selected left or right or up or down. A color coding indicates at 
a glance the density of responses. 
Our web game experimental apparatus can be utilized for sequential games with a live individual 
against an artificial player, or (with some modifications for pairs of live individuals in a classroom) 
however the first concern here has been with the one shot games where the influence of structure should 
be at its highest. In a related paper [Shubik, 2012] a number of different solutions for the one shot game 
are discussed. 
 
3.3.1. A problem with timing 
As is well known in experimental gaming in general the distortions caused by time pressures may be of 
considerable importance. Here where we are dealing with purely abstract games, in as sterile and barren a 
context as is feasible, problems with time are manifested in both the possibilities of boredom and the 
pressures of being overwhelmed by too many decisions. An immediate goal has been to obtain some 
insights into as to how individuals would play the 144 games that constitute the full closed set of all 
strategic variations in the 2 2  game. But it is fairly evident that to have an individual decide on how to 
play 144 games in a single session is too much. Even half that number may be a burden. But as many of 
this set of matrix games have dominant strategies, preliminary testing suggested that for almost all 
individuals the playing of 78 matrix games would require no less than 30 minutes and no more than two 
hours, with most of the players within the range of around 50–70 minutes. One eminent game theorist 
declined to participate in the game because he estimated that for him to think sufficiently carefully about 
how he should play 78 matrix games might require of the order of a week's work. This is illustrative of 
the difference between a normative and behavioristic approach to simple matrix games. 
The number of 78 (=66 + 12) games was selected because one can construct two sets of games where 
in the first set there are 66 games where the score from the sum of the equilibrium solutions is in favor of 
Row and the remaining 12 games are completely symmetric with the roles of the Row player and the 
Column player being identical. The second set of games has the same 12 symmetric games and the 66 
transposes where to roles of Row and Column is interchanged. If the performance of two sets of players 
on the 12 symmetric games are not statistically different this would justify combining the data from the 
two runs giving a coverage of all 144 games. 
In operational gaming, such as war gaming, context and timing are of considerable importance. The 
argument being that human decision-making does not take place in a vacuum, and thus it is important to 
set the stage appropriately. The games presented here are at the other extreme. They are simple abstract 
structures supplied with as little a context as possible. A question that merits answering is how much do 
these abstract structures guide the decision-making? 
 
3.3.2. Facts and rat facts 
It has been suggested that there are many types of facts in empirical work depending heavily on both the 
context and the population studied. Experimental game theory at most is of the order of sixty to seventy 
years old and has utilized only modest resources. In biological research many interesting items may be 
found out about rats; but the most important questions often involve how well can one generalize from the 
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rat facts to observations about humans?  Can we generalize from games played by professional game 
theorists as players to the same games and briefings played with undergraduates or social psychologists or 
the man on the street?  If they do we may have some extra confidence in the influence of structure in 
context impoverished structures. One cannot dismiss the possibility that the results from the anonymous 
matrix game paradigm may be regarded as grossly pathological when context is taken into account. In 
actual decision-making, when confronted with choices between A and B, the optimal solution may to 
generate and choose C. 
 
 
4. The Gaming System 
An immediate use of the gaming system has been aimed at the study of the complete set of 2 2  games, 
but an understanding of the ease with new games can be constructed and utilized is given in Appendix 1 
where the specifics and details of use are noted. 
 
5 Other Uses for Teaching and Research 
The concern here has been primarily with a program for experimentation with one shot experimental 
games; but it is evident that many of the more interesting questions in the development and applications 
of game theory involve the investigation of repeated games with many time periods in order to consider 
items such as learning, teaching, reputation, incomplete information and lack of common knowledge. 
 
5.1. Multistage games and artificial players 
In our initial construction of the system we have not yet addressed the building of a facility to run 
multistage games in a flexible manner on the web. There are many technical problems involving timing 
and coordination of players, not unlike the programming problems faced in playing on-line backgammon 
or chess; but somewhat worse. However, there are two simple, useful extensions that may be made that do 
not require heavy costs. They involve adjustments for both the classroom and the web. In particular it is 
relatively easy to have an individual play against an artificial player. In matrix games the construction of 
an artificial player involves little more than specifying a formal game strategy to serve as the artificial 
player. The individual then plays against a sequence of the same matrix with the artificial agent updated 
according to the strategy specified.  
 
5.1.1. An inventory of artificial players 
For game structures as simple as these it is easy to write an artificial player who is nothing more than a 
strategy or algorithm for how to select a move at each information set.  In his Prisoner's Dilemma 
experiment Axelrod [Axelrod 1984] asked all participants to submit a strategy which was then treated as a 
player to be matched against all others. As soon as a sequential game is of any length the proliferation of 
strategies is enormous. It is evident from experimental work that individuals tend to keep the complexity 
of a formal strategy highly limited. A few examples include the random or entropic player who selects a 
move with probability of 50:50 each period; the optimal responder, who maximizes against the previous 
outcome. A third artificial player (designed primarily for the Prisoner’s Dilemma played repeatedly by the 
same pair, or any other game for which the concept of double-cross can be made meaningful) would start 
with tit-for-tat, then increase the punishment as a function of the number of times double crossed.  
 
5.1.2. On modifications 
In a classroom it requires a relatively inexpensive adjustment to have two individuals play against 
each other if they are in the same place at the same time. The only extra software required is that after 
Row or Column has moved the other player prompted for her move. When this is forthcoming, both are 
informed and the game goes to the next play. 
The two variants noted above that provide simple extensions have not been done as yet, in keeping 
with the philosophy advocated here modifications should be made in demand to use. For individuals 
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wishing to adapt this apparatus for their own teaching and/or research requirements they can obtain. The 
apparatus is available to Yale faculty by contacting martin.shubik@yale.edu  and samuel.cohen@yale.edu 
 at The Center for Media and Instructional Innovation to register as a game constructor and monitor and to 
obtain operating information. 
 
5.2. Multistage Games and Incomplete Information 
The games discussed so far have considered two players facing jointly known matrix games; 
however instead of entering numbers into the payoffs for both agents A and B, instead they only see their 
own payoff they may be asked to deduce the payoffs of the other player after repeated play (see Shubik [ 
1962)] for an example of such an experiment where the matrix perceived by A at the start looks like 
 
 1 2 
1 11,?a  12 ,?a  
2 21,?a  22 ,?a  
Table 3 
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APPENDIX 1.A: Explanation of Administrator’s Gaming System 
 




This is the homepage that can be found at the URL: http://econgames.research.yale.edu/monitor/. 
To log in as an administrator, enter the login credentials used to register you for the website and 







Immediately after logging into the system, this is the page that will display. This page can also 
be accessed by clicking “Super Home” on the bar across the top of the screen. 
 
On this screen there are choices for where to proceed next. Each of these is explained in more 
detail when the particular page is displayed in this appendix. 
 Clicking “Define Experiments” will bring you to the page that lists all experiments that 
have been run using this gaming system. Clicking “Define groups” on the lower part of 
the page will also bring you to the same page that clicking “Define Experiments” does. 
 Clicking “Define Games” will bring you to the page that lists all of the matrices that are 
in use in the gaming system. 
 Clicking “Define Sets” will bring you to the page that lists all of the available sets of 










The games page appears as above. Each game is assigned a game id sequentially based on when 
it is created. Descriptions are optional, but can be used to keep track of what type of game is 
being played or of specific games such as prisoners dilemma or stag hunt. The payoffs to each 
player are specified in the cells of the matrix; payoffs to the row player are specified before 
payoffs to the column player. Checkboxes indicate which cells of the matrix correspond to Nash 
equilibria of the normal form game. To create a new game, go to the bottom of the screen and 
specify the payoffs (1, 2, 3, or 4) to each player and (optional) a description. Then click 
“Submit”. This will create the new game in the system and can be used later in creating sets for 
experimentation. Here, a superuser can also delete games. To delete a game, simply check the 
box next to the trash can image and click submit on the bottom of the page. Be very careful, 
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however, since games, once deleted, cannot be recovered and there is no warning message or 






The sets page lets one edit and create new sets. One does so by entering a new set name next to 
“new” and providing a description. Once one clicks ‘Submit’, the page refreshes and a link 
allowing one to edit the games in the set appears in the column labeled “Edit games in set”. By 







Here, the user can rearrange the order of games. If one checks a box in the column “? as other 
player payoff”, then the game (if included in the set) will only show each user their own payoffs 
when playing the game, and place question marks for the payoffs of the opposing player. When 
checking boxes in the last column labeled “Include in the set”, the user can select which games 
are to be included in the set they have created. Games (from “Define Games”) will be displayed 
to participants and included in the set if “include in the set” is checked off; furthermore, games 
will appear in the order specified by the numbers in the “order” column with the game with order 






This page can be accessed by clicking “Define Experiments” in the navigation bar on the top of 
the website. To create a new experiment one has to enter a name for the experiment, provide a 
password that users will use, and then select a set of games to use (from “Define Sets”). After the 
user hits submit at the bottom of the page, a link to that experiment will be generated. If a user 
wishes to end the experiment they are running, they can hit the link in the column marked 
“terminate”. Players will not be able to participate in an experiment while it is terminated. 
Terminated experiments can be un-terminated in the same fashion. To view the results of an 
experiment, one clicks on the links in the “calculate payoff” column. 
 




The games appear in the order in which they were presented to the experiment subjects. Each 
game is shown in normal form with payoffs to row players on the left and payoffs to column 
players on the right. The bold numbers below each column and to the right of each row show the 
number of players that selected that strategy. The percentages displayed under each box are 
calculated according to the following formula: (number of row players who played given 
strategy)(number of column players who played given strategy)(100)/(total row players*total 
column players). The shading of payoffs gives us a visual representation of the aggregate results. 
Darker colors mean the payoff pair was realized more frequently as compared to payoff pairs 






The monitor can see the e-mail addresses of each person who participated in the experiment and 
their scores. After the monitor has seen the data, he or she may remove the e-mail addresses 





A score is calculated for each individual matrix game by finding the sum of a player’s payoffs 
against all of the other players playing as the opponent. For example, in the visual above, Student 
5 is a row player. He played top. 24 column players played left (each giving him a payout of 4) 














2/14/12 The Prisoner's Dilemma and Its Other 575 Companions - Main Page
1/2econgames.research.yale.edu/main.php
ONE
No prior knowledge of Game Theory is required to play, but a
simple example of a single game is provided to illustrate the choices
you face.
A 2 x 2 matrix game is shown to the left. There are two players
identified as the row player and the column player. A row player has a
move that consists of choosing either the top row (UP) or the bottom
row (DOWN). The choice of the column player is to select the left
(LEFT) or right (RIGHT) column.
The table that has two entries in each cell shows the points obtained by
the two players. The first number specifies the points to the row player
and the second to the column player. For example if the row player
chooses UP and column chooses LEFT, the row player obtains 1 and the
column player obtains 4. If they choose DOWN and RIGHT
respectively the payoff to row is 2 and to column is 3.
TWO
 
Select a row by clicking anywhere on it. Once a row is selected, click the
Next button to advance to the next game matrix. The image to the left
is show with the first row selected.
You will be matched in all of the 24 games you are playing in by all of
the row players. Your final score will be calculated by adding the score
you obtained in each of the 24 games against everyone of the column
players and then adding together your score in each of the 24 games. A
prize will of $xx will be given to the player with the highest score. In
the event of ties there will be a randomization to select one winner.
You already played 78 games, you will be directed to the thank you
page.
LOGOUT  LEARN MORE
THE PRI SONER'S DI LEMMA AND I TS OTHER 575 COMPANI ONS
GAME RULES
 
The rules page describes the rules for playing the games. It explains how to interpret the game 






These pages display the games and let players pick strategies. Row players pick a row by clicking on 
it. Column players click on columns to select them. A player may change their choice by clicking on 
the row/column they did not originally select. To finalize one’s decision and continue to the next 
game, a player should click on the “NEXT” button. 
Thank You Page: 
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Game # Matrix Row PSNE Col PSNE Favors Type Alt. Eq.
2 (1, 2) (3, 1) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 3)
5 (1, 3) (3, 4) 3 4 column
(4, 1) (2, 2)
16 (1, 2) (2, 3) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 1)
18 (1, 2) (2, 1) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 3)
27 (1, 3) (2, 2) 3 4 column
(4, 1) (3, 4)
30 (1, 2) (2, 3) 3 4 column
(4, 1) (3, 4)
33 (1, 1) (2, 3) 3 4 column
(4, 2) (3, 4)
34 (1, 1) (2, 2) 3 4 column
(4, 3) (3, 4)
38 (1, 4) (4, 2) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (3, 1)
40 (1, 4) (4, 1) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (3, 2)















45 (1, 3) (4, 1) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (3, 2)
49 (1, 2) (4, 1) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (3, 3)
63 (1, 3) (4, 2) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (2, 1)
66 (1, 3) (4, 1) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (2, 2)
71 (1, 2) (4, 1) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (2, 3)
76 (1, 1) (4, 2) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (2, 3)
79 (1, 1) (2, 2) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 3)
80 (1, 1) (2, 3) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 2)
86 (1, 3) (2, 1) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 2)
87 (1, 3) (2, 2) 3 4 column
(3, 4) (4, 1)
94 (1, 2) (2, 1) 3 4 column
(4, 3) (3, 4)
96 (1, 3) (2, 1) 3 4 column
(4, 2) (3, 4)
101 (1, 1) (3, 2) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 3)
103 (1, 1) (3, 3) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 2)
105 (1, 1) (3, 4) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (4, 2)
108 (1, 2) (3, 3) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 1)
110 (1, 2) (3, 4) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (4, 1)
112 (1, 3) (3, 1) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 2)
114 (1, 3) (3, 2) 2 4 column
(2, 4) (4, 1)
118 (1, 4) (3, 1) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (4, 2)
120 (1, 4) (3, 2) 2 3 column
(2, 3) (4, 1)
125 (1, 1) (3, 4) 3 4 column
(4, 2) (2, 3)
128 (1, 2) (3, 4) 3 4 column
(4, 1) (2, 3)
133 (1, 3) (3, 4) 3 4 column
(4, 2) (2, 1)
6 (1, 3) (3, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 1) (2, 4)
39 (1, 4) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 2) (3, 3)
44 (1, 3) (4, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 1) (3, 4)
50 (1, 2) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 3) (3, 4)
57 (1, 4) (4, 3) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 1) (2, 2)
59 (1, 4) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 2) (2, 3)
64 (1, 3) (4, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 1) (2, 4)
65 (1, 3) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 2) (2, 4)
72 (1, 2) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 3) (2, 4)
1 (1, 4) (3, 3) 2 2 tie S
(2, 2) (4, 1)
3 (1, 1) (3, 2) 4 4 tie S
(2, 3) (4, 4)
7 (1, 2) (3, 3) 4 4 tie S
(4, 4) (2, 1)
10 (1, 1) (3, 4) 3 4 tie S *(4,3)
(4, 3) (2, 2)
12 (1, 4) (2, 2) 3 3 tie S
(3, 3) (4, 1)
19 (1, 1) (2, 3) 4 4 tie S
(3, 2) (4, 4)
26 (1, 3) (2, 2) 4 4 tie S
(4, 4) (3, 1)
35 (1, 1) (2, 4) 3 3 tie S
(4, 2) (3, 3)
41 (1, 3) (4, 4) 4 4 tie S
(2, 2) (3, 1)
53 (1, 1) (4, 2) 2 4 tie S *(4,2)
(2, 4) (3, 3)
69 (1, 2) (4, 4) 4 4 tie S
(3, 3) (2, 1)
74 (1, 1) (4, 3) 3 4 tie S *(4,3)
(3, 4) (2, 2)
8 (1, 2) (3, 1) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (2, 3)
15 (1, 3) (2, 2) 4 4 tie
(3, 1) (4, 4)
20 (1, 1) (2, 2) 4 4 tie
(3, 3) (4, 4)
21 (1, 1) (2, 4) 3 3 tie
(3, 3) (4, 2)
24 (1, 4) (2, 1) 3 3 tie
(4, 2) (3, 3)
28 (1, 3) (2, 1) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (3, 2)
29 (1, 2) (2, 3) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (3, 1)
31 (1, 2) (2, 4) 3 3 tie
(4, 1) (3, 3)
32 (1, 2) (2, 1) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (3, 3)
37 (1, 4) (4, 3) 2 2 tie
(2, 2) (3, 1)
42 (1, 3) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(2, 1) (3, 2)
48 (1, 2) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(2, 1) (3, 3)
54 (1, 1) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(2, 2) (3, 3)
55 (1, 1) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(2, 3) (3, 2)
58 (1, 4) (4, 2) 3 3 tie
(3, 3) (2, 1)
60 (1, 4) (4, 1) 3 3 tie
(3, 3) (2, 2)
61 (1, 3) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(3, 2) (2, 1)
62 (1, 3) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(3, 1) (2, 2)
67 (1, 2) (4, 3) 3 4 tie *(4,3)
(3, 4) (2, 1)
70 (1, 2) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(3, 1) (2, 3)
77 (1, 1) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(3, 2) (2, 3)




Game # Matrix Row PSNE Col PSNE Favors Type Alt. Eq.
4 (1, 4) (3, 3) 4 2 row
(4, 2) (2, 1)
9 (1, 1) (3, 2) 3 2 row
(4, 3) (2, 4)
11 (1, 4) (2, 3) 3 2 row
(3, 2) (4, 1)
13 (1, 4) (2, 1) 4 3 row
(3, 2) (4, 3)
14 (1, 3) (2, 4) 4 2 row
(3, 1) (4, 2)
17 (1, 2) (2, 4) 4 3 row
(3, 1) (4, 3)
22 (1, 4) (2, 3) 4 2 row
(4, 2) (3, 1)
23 (1, 4) (2, 2) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (3, 1)
25 (1, 3) (2, 4) 3 2 row
(4, 1) (3, 2)
36 (1, 1) (2, 4) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (3, 2)
46 (1, 2) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(2, 4) (3, 1)
47 (1, 2) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(2, 1) (3, 4)
51 (1, 1) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(2, 2) (3, 4)
52 (1, 1) (4, 2) 4 2 row
(2, 3) (3, 4)
56 (1, 4) (4, 3) 3 2 row
(3, 2) (2, 1)
68 (1, 2) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(3, 1) (2, 4)
73 (1, 1) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(3, 2) (2, 4)
75 (1, 1) (4, 2) 4 2 row
(3, 3) (2, 4)
81 (1, 1) (2, 4) 4 3 row
(3, 2) (4, 3)
88 (1, 3) (2, 4) 3 2 row
(3, 2) (4, 1)
90 (1, 4) (2, 2) 4 3 row
(3, 1) (4, 3)
91 (1, 4) (2, 3) 4 2 row
(3, 1) (4, 2)
95 (1, 2) (2, 4) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (3, 1)
97 (1, 3) (2, 4) 4 2 row
(4, 2) (3, 1)
98 (1, 4) (2, 1) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (3, 2)
100 (1, 4) (2, 3) 3 2 row
(4, 1) (3, 2)
104 (1, 1) (3, 4) 4 3 row
(2, 2) (4, 3)
109 (1, 2) (3, 4) 4 3 row
(2, 1) (4, 3)
115 (1, 3) (3, 4) 4 2 row
(2, 1) (4, 2)
117 (1, 4) (3, 1) 4 3 row
(2, 2) (4, 3)
119 (1, 4) (3, 2) 4 3 row
(2, 1) (4, 3)
121 (1, 4) (3, 3) 4 2 row
(2, 1) (4, 2)
135 (1, 4) (3, 1) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (2, 2)
137 (1, 4) (3, 2) 4 3 row
(4, 3) (2, 1)
139 (1, 1) (4, 3) 4 3 row
(2, 4) (3, 2)
126 (1, 2) (3, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 3) (2, 4)
130 (1, 3) (3, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 2) (2, 4)
134 (1, 4) (3, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 2) (2, 3)
136 (1, 4) (3, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 1) (2, 3)
138 (1, 4) (3, 3) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(4, 1) (2, 2)
141 (1, 3) (4, 1) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 2) (3, 4)
142 (1, 4) (4, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 1) (3, 3)
143 (1, 4) (4, 3) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(2, 1) (3, 2)
144 (1, 4) (4, 2) 2.5 2.5 tie M
(3, 1) (2, 3)
1 (1, 4) (3, 3) 2 2 tie S
(2, 2) (4, 1)
3 (1, 1) (3, 2) 4 4 tie S
(2, 3) (4, 4)
7 (1, 2) (3, 3) 4 4 tie S
(4, 4) (2, 1)
10 (1, 1) (3, 4) 4 3 tie S *(3,4)
(4, 3) (2, 2)
12 (1, 4) (2, 2) 3 3 tie S
(3, 3) (4, 1)
19 (1, 1) (2, 3) 4 4 tie S
(3, 2) (4, 4)
26 (1, 3) (2, 2) 4 4 tie S
(4, 4) (3, 1)
35 (1, 1) (2, 4) 3 3 tie S
(4, 2) (3, 3)
41 (1, 3) (4, 4) 4 4 tie S
(2, 2) (3, 1)
53 (1, 1) (4, 2) 4 2 tie S *(2,4)
(2, 4) (3, 3)
69 (1, 2) (4, 4) 4 4 tie S
(3, 3) (2, 1)
74 (1, 1) (4, 3) 4 3 tie S *(3,4)
(3, 4) (2, 2)
82 (1, 2) (2, 1) 4 4 tie
(3, 3) (4, 4)
83 (1, 2) (2, 3) 4 4 tie
(3, 1) (4, 4)
84 (1, 2) (2, 4) 3 3 tie
(3, 3) (4, 1)
85 (1, 3) (2, 1) 4 4 tie
(3, 2) (4, 4)
89 (1, 4) (2, 1) 3 3 tie
(3, 3) (4, 2)
92 (1, 1) (2, 2) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (3, 3)
93 (1, 1) (2, 3) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (3, 2)
99 (1, 4) (2, 2) 3 3 tie
(4, 1) (3, 3)
102 (1, 1) (3, 3) 4 4 tie
(2, 2) (4, 4)
106 (1, 2) (3, 1) 4 4 tie
(2, 3) (4, 4)
107 (1, 2) (3, 3) 4 4 tie
(2, 1) (4, 4)
111 (1, 3) (3, 1) 4 4 tie
(2, 2) (4, 4)
113 (1, 3) (3, 2) 4 4 tie
(2, 1) (4, 4)
116 (1, 3) (3, 4) 2 2 tie
(2, 2) (4, 1)
122 (1, 1) (3, 2) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (2, 3)
123 (1, 1) (3, 3) 3 3 tie
(4, 2) (2, 4)
124 (1, 1) (3, 3) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (2, 2)
127 (1, 2) (3, 3) 3 3 tie
(4, 1) (2, 4)
129 (1, 2) (3, 4) 4 3 tie *(3,4)
(4, 3) (2, 1)
131 (1, 3) (3, 1) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (2, 2)
132 (1, 3) (3, 2) 4 4 tie
(4, 4) (2, 1)
140 (1, 2) (4, 4) 4 4 tie
(2, 3) (3, 1)
Total: 281.5 232.5
